The media are all over it, as is the law-oriented side of the blogosphere.
I refer here to the decision issued Wednesday by the U.S. Supreme Court. It's taken me hours of reading to grasp what the Court has done, and I think I do now, finally, understand it. This is my longest post ever, and I invite you to stay with me while I inspect what the Court hath wrought. The cases decided Wednesday implicate our constitutional rights, the powers of Congress and the role of the judiciary.
Constitutional and federal statutory law are often thought to be the province of lawyers, and I'm not a lawyer. But I believe the law belongs to all of us -- it applies to all of us -- and that it behooves us as a free people to understand what our courts are doing with it. I have labored mightily in this entry to be clear and detailed, and to take complex issues and make them understandable. When I write to explain something, I write to explain it to myself. But I trust the explanation here will be serviceable to other laymen. (If you're a lawyer and find where I've misstated any point of fact or law, please send e-mail so that I can correct the error promptly.)
Let's start with the text of the Sixth Amendment, which provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
First in the case of Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) and then again in Blakely v. Washington (2003), an unusual alliance of liberals and conservatives on the U.S. Supreme Court construed the Sixth Amendment to stand for, among other things, this simple proposition:
... any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Apprendi, a jury convicted the defendant of the unlawful possession of a firearm, an offense for which the law provided 5 to 10 years in prison. But following the return of the jury's verdict, the trial judge found the defendant to have been motivated by racial animus and sentenced him to 12 years -- two years more than the law allowed for the firearms offense. The factual basis for this enhanced penalty had not been submitted to the jury for its consideration. The New Supreme Court affirmed.
But on appeal the U.S. Supreme Court reversed:
... the Sixth Amendment's notice and jury trial guarantees require that any fact other than prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Blakely, the defendant plead guilty to kidnaping his estranged wife, an offense for which the law allowed a maximum sentence of 53 months. But the judge concluded the defendant had acted with deliberate cruelty and enhanced the sentence to 90 months. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed.
Again, on appeal the U.S. Supreme Court reversed:
Because the facts supporting petitioner’s exceptional sentence were neither admitted by petitioner nor found by a jury, the sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
In other words, under Apprendi and Blakely, any fact, save for the fact of a prior conviction, used in determining penalty must either be admitted to by the defendant or else submitted to a jury for its consideration.
So far, so good, yes? After all, isn't that the very meaning of a right to trial by jury? As three of the Court's liberals and two of its conservatives have noted:
... [t]he Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, before depriving a man of ... more years of his liberty, the State should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours, rather than a lone employee of the state.
Apprendi and Blakely involved the sentencing practices of states (New Jersey and Washington, respectively). In the two cases decided Wednesday, federal sentencing practices were at issue.
In affixing th