In brief, the story you already know:
A grand jury in Austin charged [House majority leader Tom] DeLay, 58, and two associates already facing criminal charges with a single count of criminal conspiracy, accusing them of improperly funneling corporate donations to Republican candidates for the Texas legislature.
Now before going any further, let’s stipulate to the obvious:
We knew all along that Tom DeLay was a bully — ask the Heritage Foundation about his penchant for petty grudges. We knew all along that he was, on a fundamental level, unprincipled — ask him about the fat in the Federal budget. We knew all along that he was mostly interested in power for its own sake — recall, please, that he sought a House rules change to protect his leadership position in this very circumstance. And we knew that if it came to an indictment, it would be the end.
Agreed. But I’m not interested here in whether Tom DeLay is a power hungry politician who’s forgotten his principles, or even whether Ronnie Earle is a partisan hack who’s engaged in a political prosecution. I’m interested in the narrow question raised by the indictment: Did Tom DeLay violate the law? The answer is no.
The grand jury indicted Mr. DeLay and his associates for a violation of Texas Penal Code § 15.02, Criminal Conspiracy.
The object offense (i.e., the predicate of the alleged conspiracy) is a violation of Texas Election Code Sections 253.003, 253.094 and 253.104.
The indictment alleges that Mr. DeLay and his associates conspired to make an unlawful contribution of corporate money to a political party within 60 days of an election. Specifically:
“[a] contribution was made directly to the Republican National Committee, a political party, during a period beginning sixty days before the date of a general election for state and county officers and continuing through the date of the election, and indirectly to candidates for the Texas House of Representatives, and that said contribution included a prohibited contribution by a corporation …”
The indictment’s description of the Republican National Committee (RNC) as a “political party” is important; indeed, I think it key. You will search the Texas Election Code in vain for a definition of “political party.” What you’ll find instead is a lot of inferential evidence that for purposes of the statute, a “political party” — to whom corporate contributions were prohibited during the time in question — is a state-level creature, which the Republican National Committee is not. You’ll also find a definition of “political committee” as “a group of persons that has as a principal purpose accepting political contributions or making political expenditures,” which the Republican National Committee is. But the statute doesn’t prohibit corporate contributions to political committees.
Texans for a Republican Majority (TRM), a political committee, took money from corporations, including Sears and Bacardi. Since corporations cannot make contributions to Texas House candidates, TRM sent the corporate money it collected to the Republican National State Elections Committee (RNSEC), an arm of the RNC. The RNSEC then exchanged — or, if you prefer, laundered — the (prohibited) corporate contributions for (permissible) personal contributions and paid out the latter to Republican candidates for the Texas Legislature. Was this a way of getting around the statute? Yes, of course. But as Brit Hume put it, the difference here is between a scheme to violate the law and a scheme to avoid violating the law. (By the way, the “laundering” of soft for hard dollars is a practice employed by Texas Democrats and Republicans alike, with no one having ever thought anything of it before now.)
If there was no predicate offense, then there could be no conspiracy to commit the predicate offense. And if there was no conspiracy to commit the predicate offense, then Mr. DeLay is not guilty of the charge contained in the indictment. (Incidentally, even were we to assume that a violation of the law occurred, thus making the conspiracy charge at least plausible, the indictment offers no evidence at all that Mr. DeLay was party to it. If you doubt this, read for yourself the short-on-particulars work of the Travis County Grand Jury.)