Yesterday, U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor1 described the National Security Agency’s Terrorist Surveillance Program as “obviously in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Judge Taylor then enjoined the Government from making any use of the TSP, the existence of which the New York Times disclosed in December 2005.
Judge Taylor’s memorandum opinion is here; the injunction is here.2
The Government will appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
You’ll find thoughtful analysis at Volokh Conspiracy, Baseball Crank and Power Line.
In reading Judge Taylor’s opinion, I was struck by how … amateurish it is. Never mind the rule of law. This judge has trouble following the rules of punctuation. It’s alarming to know that someone with writing and reasoning skills as poor as Judge Taylor’s sits on a United States district court.
Even the Washington Post (yes, the Washington Post), which harbors “grave doubt both that Congress authorized warrantless surveillance as part of the war and that Mr. Bush has the constitutional power to act outside of normal surveillance statutes,” was nevertheless contemptuous of Judge Taylor’s intellectually shoddy work:
… the decision yesterday by a federal district court in Detroit, striking down the NSA’s program, is neither careful nor scholarly, and it is hard-hitting only in the sense that a bludgeon is hard-hitting. The angry rhetoric of U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor will no doubt grab headlines. But as a piece of judicial work — that is, as a guide to what the law requires and how it either restrains or permits the NSA’s program — her opinion will not be helpful.
And then there’s this from a Kos diarist (I say, I say a Kos diarist):
While I wholeheartedly agree with the general result, the court’s opinion and reasoning are weak in a variety of ways, and given the magnitude of the opinion and the efforts that will be made to undermine it, I fear that Judge Diggs Taylor has, in the long run, undermined those of us who have believed the NSA program is illegal since its existence was revealed several months ago.
[…]
Given that today’s decision is certain to be appealed to the Sixth Circuit (and then the Supreme Court, though the latter may decline to review the case), today’s opinion should not be of much comfort to opponents of the NSA’s program. Its conclusory nature and its failure to address in detail the arguments for and against the program will simply lead to confusion and perhaps even full-scale relitigation of the issues on appeal.
Here’s a sample of Judge Taylor’s “analysis.” On page 31 of her opinion, she writes that the Fourth Amendment “requires prior warrants for any reasonable search, based upon prior-existing probable cause, as well as particularity as to persons, places, and things …” Jesus Christ! For years now, I’ve had the odd, avocational habit of reading court opinions. And never have I seen a judge write anything that appallingly stupid.
Most searches in this country are warrantless. If Judge Taylor doubts this, she should visit the Detroit Metro Airport; there she can observe agents with the Transportation Security Administration as they search the bodies and bags of thousands of air transport passengers. Those agents do not have a warrant; in fact, they don’t even have probable cause, if by probable cause we mean reasonable, individualized suspicion of a crime. Those agents have nothing — except for a national security or exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, which are two of many exceptions. If Judge Taylor doesn’t care for airports, she can visit a border crossing; there she’ll watch as agents with the U.S. Border Patrol feel people up and down and dig through their belongings. Those agents don’t have a warrant either. They have a border search exception.
As law professor Orin Kerr writes:
It’s true that the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable searches. But Fourth Amendment reasonableness is satisfied by a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement, and there are several possible exceptions to the warrant requirement that may apply. Whether and how they may or may not apply depends on the facts of the surveillance, which are currently unknown. [Italics in original.]
Also, identifying a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications is really quite complicated given new communications technologies; for example, courts have held that there is no [reasonable expectation of privacy] in transactional information and cordless phone calls, and individuals with no voluntary contact with the U.S. presumably have no Fourth Amendment rights at all. We’d need to know the details of the surveillance to know this, but we don’t know those details.
ACLU v. NSA presented many questions, including the question of standing, which is likely to figure prominently on appeal. Some of these questions are not easily answered, and I don’t mean to suggest that the law here is unambiguously clear, or that the president undoubtedly has the inherent power to authorize the survelliance at issue here, or that we should take a devil-may-care attitude toward the Government’s eavesdropping. Although I support the TSP in principle and believe the president was within his constitutional authority in authorizing it, I’m not saying there’s no case to be made against it. (We don’t have all the facts, which makes it impossible to know whether the program as applied is legal or not.) But I am saying that if there is a case to be made against the TSP, Judge Taylor didn’t make it. Her opinion is shrill, partisan and vacuous. We deserve better from our judges.
ADDED —
From what’s publicly known about it, the TSP doesn’t exist to serve the ordinary aims of criminal law enforcement. So far as any of us know, nobody in the United States has been criminally prosecuted with evidence gathered by the TSP. Rather, the program exists to detect and disrupt terrorist activity. This distinction in purpose is important. The attack of 9/11 was catastrophic; it cost the Nation thousands of lives, more than 100,000 jobs and billions in property damage. Our Government surely has a “special need” in preventing another, similar attack.
In Sealed Case No. 02-001, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review wrote:
The distinction between ordinary criminal prosecutions and extraordinary situations underlies the Supreme Court’s approval of entirely warrantless and even suspicionless searches that are designed to serve the government’s “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” [Emphasis added.]
Technorati Tags: NSA, surveillance, searches, courts, law, Constitution, terrorism
1 Appointed in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter. Sits on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division. (Source)
2 The injunction is temporarily stayed by stipulation of the parties. The district court will hear argument on September 7 on the Government’s motion for stay pending appeal.